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Introduction 
 
This paper sketches out some preliminary thoughts about what it might mean to 
conceptualise critique as a textured and variegated cultural practice, and whether it is 
possible and desirable to study it as we do other cultural practices, ethnographically. I would 
like to begin by posing three questions, taking as a point of departure Nikolas Kompridis’ 
statement that in modern capitalist societies there is nothing ‘more urgent today than to 
resist the sense that our possibilities are contracting or that they are exhausted’ (2006: 280). 
First, then, is this statement true, in the broadest sense of the term? Second, if this were the 
case, what kind of cultural practices, what kinds of knowledge, and what ways of being with 
others have the effect of opening futures up rather than closing them down—and should we 
necessarily accept the ones that critical theorists recommend as positive goods? Finally, if 
we can recognise these practices in theoretical or philosophical terms, should we also try to 
study them in more ‘empirical’ or interpretive ways?  
 
The rest of this paper offers some tentative responses to each of these questions, with the 
conclusions as follows. First, I will argue that despite a plethora of diagnoses by some of the 
most eminent critical theorists of our time that we are experiencing a generalised ‘crisis of 
hope’ in modern capitalist societies, it is difficult to establish this in either empirical or grand 
theoretical terms (Bourdieu 1999; Habermas 1989; Kompridis 2006), or to argue that such a 
‘crisis’ could be either evenly distributed in material terms or pervasive in cultural ones. In 
the first instance, the experience of ‘crisis’ is principally a subjective and affective one 
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(Kompridis 2006: 21). Secondly, however, there are also numerous examples that a certain 
number of regressive and repressive ‘hopes’ and utopian visions enjoy near-hegemonic 
status as global political imaginaries; I am thinking here not only of the fantasy spaces built 
outside of all ethical and regulatory constraints in order to enable obscene levels of 
consumption and exclusion (Davis and Monk 2006), but also what Pierre Bourdieu once 
referred to as the neoliberal ‘utopia of endless exploitation’ (1998). If so many of our 
‘cultural traditions...social practices and political institutions’ are ‘breaking down or 
challenged in such a way as to preclude going on as before’ (Kompridis 2006: 1); if there is 
‘no such thing as normal anymore’ (Kompridis 2006: 247), then how do we explain the great 
cultural consolidation of capitalist modernisation? How do we solve the puzzle that, 
contrary in fact to recent evidence of its internal contradictions, its ‘processes appear 
inexorable [and] capture almost all the available logical space...bewitch...[and] captivate’? If 
there is a ‘crisis of hope’—and I will argue that the phrase does have some analytical 
value—it must be more specifically located than this.  
 
Fortunately, it is possible to locate it. There is a multitude of sites, in both public and private 
spheres across a number of postmodern capitalist societies, where political discourses have 
become saturated with a nebulous but often nearly visceral ‘sense’ or ‘feel’ of contracting 
possibilities, of cultural and intellectual repression, and of political and economic 
powerlessness; a sense that the nature and exercise of power is changing, and a 
disorientation about how to name it. In education, party politics, the arts, social care, 
environmental movements, medicine, intimate relationships and emotional labour, we can 
thus see both shifts in the ‘forms of life’ and calls for the renewal of critique, utopianism and 
cultural practice. I believe it is significant that within some of these spaces, we see the rise 
of small but tenacious movements to resist not just the ‘sense’ of despair in a psychological 
interpretation, but more importantly to re-theorise the meanings of power, of critique and 
of utopia and to articulate them as integral parts of new struggles against both neoliberal 
and neoconservative practices.  
 
Axel Honneth has recently argued that in order for critical theory to be more than elite 
philosophical platitudes, it must develop in response to what he called ‘pre-theoretical’ 
desires for emancipation in society itself (2007: 64). For some, it is precisely these 
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indications that appear to be missing, evidenced by the absence of widespread and overt 
resistance to exploitation and collective depression. On the contrary, I think that the sort of 
‘consciousness of crisis’ which characterises critical theory is indeed emerging from direct 
experiences of contradiction and disorientation in everyday life within neoliberal capitalist 
societies, and perhaps not from the most predictable speakers (Barthes 1977; Benhabib 
1986; Habermas 1987; Honneth 2007; Kompridis 2006: 18). It is thus possible that lived 
moments of crisis or disorientation, or indeed practices of outright resistance and rebellion 
against domination, are often missed or misrecognised not simply because they have 
become less frequent but because the time and practice of power has itself changed. In 
diagnosing the contemporary crisis of hope theoretically, critical philosophers too often 
ignore the dialectical possibilities opened up by this materiality of human practice. The call 
for the expansion of critical cultural practice is happening from the ground up as well as 
from the top down, and resistance to the contraction of possibility—even if only as 
unarticulated resistance at times—has kept open, or pried open, new spaces in which 
people can, as Kompridis suggests is necessary, develop new ‘vocabularies of possibility’ and 
‘awaken new social types and new normative expectations’ (Kompridis 2006: 137). Having 
said this, we must remain conscious of the productive tension between these noises—
admittedly, often audible only from the political margins of any of these fields, and not en 
masse—and the more general theories of the ‘exhaustion of utopian energies’ in society 
(Habermas 1989; Kompridis 2006: 129). The starting position is this: that while it is difficult 
to argue that the contraction of existential possibility is the most urgent social problem that 
any particular person faces today, I think it is fair to argue that in certain contexts it is a 
pressing, perhaps even foundational one, which calls for interdisciplinary analysis and 
critical intervention.  
 
This brings us to the second question, of what might qualify as possibility-enabling practices, 
or ‘cultural practices of hope’. This is relatively easy to answer from within the confines of 
the critical tradition, as critical theorists and activists alike have already identified particular 
ideas and practices which are understood to expand human possibility, given the 
appropriate conditions. Immediate examples are Nikolas Kompridis’ Heideggerian concept 
of ‘disclosure’; the idea of bringing experiences and ideas ‘to crisis’ (Spivak 1988; Barthes 
1977); a range of more traditional notions of critique and utopian imagination; and various 
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forms of ‘cultural resistance’ in radical political, educational and environmental movements. 
What this means in practice, however, remains ill-defined. Hence, a great deal of recent 
theoretical work has focused on which of these general forms of critique are most  
appropriate, whether critique in general requires a particular kind of normative foundation 
and how to establish one without being moralistically proscriptive, whether productive 
forms of critique actually depend on people having certain predispositions to being 
‘unsettled’, and whether the act of evaluation and judgement on the whole offends and can 
co-exist with postmodern understandings of truth. There is one general point of consensus, 
however, and that is that critique—whatever it is—is an ‘indispensible medium of historical 
interpretation and explanation’, and that it is threatened (Kompridis 2006: 130, 8). 
 
However, particularly given Adorno’s maxim that ‘it goes without saying that nothing that 
concerns critical theory goes without saying, let alone without thinking’ (cited in Kompridis 
2006: 17), we must also consider situate these claims and debates in dialogue with the 
critique of critique. Here I refer to the antithetical claims that are made, now increasingly, in 
opposition to critique, critical judgment and utopian imagination, particularly in the 
framework of the ‘new cultural sociology’ of neo-functionalist and ethnomethodological 
theorists such as Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues at Yale University (Alexander and 
Smith 2004). As I and Nancy Hanrahan have argued elsewhere (2010),  
 
[w]ithin this perspective, normative approaches to culture are often interpreted as 
both intellectually and politically regressive. Frankfurt School critical theory has also 
come to play a ‘traditional role in cultural studies [...] as a kind of negative or naive 
moment’ which ‘has to be overcome for cultural studies to properly exist at all’ 
(Nealon and Irr 2002: 3; see also Kellner 2002; Szeman 2002). 
 
Critical theorists have responded to this representation, working to defend the democratic 
and scientific credentials of critique and normativity, illustrating their anti-authoritarian 
character, offering examples of how being in and remaking the world demands the reflexive 
mastery of cultural practices such as normative evaluation and critical judgement. However, 
these responses also make clear that despite enormous faith in the transformative power of 
disclosure, imagination and dialogue as alternatives to enclosure, realism and hierarchy, 
there is little coherent analysis of how theories of critique and imagination get articulated 
by people in everyday life, or what work they actually do there. How are these practices 
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transformed when they are situated within the cultural, institutional and discursive 
frameworks that they aim to subvert and/or revolutionise? Do the terms refer to multiple 
practices which are contextual and contingent? What conditions—intellectual, institutional, 
political, affective and economic—make them possible in the first place, and which may it 
be within our power to create? Perhaps most importantly, upon which cultural resources 
may we rely when, according to the theoretical accounts of the ‘crisis of hope’, it is these 
very generative resources that have been damaged, depleted or transformed by the 
material reorganisation of social life under neoliberal capitalism? (Kompridis 2006: 76) Does 
focusing on the forms of critical practice which are ‘known’ to be connected with hope and 
social change obscure the quieter, but perhaps no less revolutionary, practices of freedom 
which are embedded in what Kompridis refers to as the ‘extraordinary ordinary’ activities of 
everyday life?1  
 
I would suggest that it is precisely the more taken-for-granted and less-fully-theorised 
understandings of critique within critical theory, radical politics and everyday life that both 
require and lend themselves to reflective and robust ethnographic examination. Kompridis 
knows this; in fact, Critique and Disclosure is in certain senses the outline of a new research 
agenda precisely to this effect.2 However, this position raises the serious question of 
whether it is sociologically plausible or responsible to imagine that we could actually study 
or understand the cultural practices of hope. Possibility—and even more so the conditions 
                                                          
1
 His points of reference for this are Hannah Arendt’s conception of ‘natality’ and—in what I find to be a 
frankly remarkable move for a critical philosopher—a parent’s experience of the birth of a child. I think that we 
should also add Ernst Bloch’s notion of the ‘not-yet’ to the debate, as well as the practices of judgment that 
make critical practice meaningful in the first place. 
 
2
 Kompridis asks the same question in various ways. ‘If we are to regenerate our confidence and hope’, he 
writes, ‘we need to understand much better than we currently do just how practices that disclose the world 
anew facilitate “both forms of life and more reflective forms of life”’ (2006: 199). What sort of practices 
expand the cultural conditions of meaning and allow it to become primary? (2006: 170). ‘What new or 
refashioned ideals, norms and practices might re-inspire confidence in the possibility, the hope for, a future 
different from the past?’ (2006: 253) ‘What accountable practice of social and cultural change, change we can 
attribute to our own agency, can take the place of revolution?’ (2006: 279) ‘Rather than steering the 
phenomena and practices of world disclosure into a sphere remote from everyday life, critical theorists need 
to conceive of everyday life and practice differently’ (2006: 113). ‘Articulating more persuasively, and 
illuminating more powerfully the goods which motivate and underwrite our critical activity, does more to 
generate utopian energies than does an overreaching and overburdened universalism’ (2006: 27). ‘What needs 
to be added to the defense of democratic forms of life is a richer account of the everyday practices that 
constitute (or are needed to constitute) them’ (2006: 76). ‘Must we not identify, as well as foster, the bundled 
set of reflective, critical, and innovative capacities through which human beings self-critically transform the 
social practices, cultural traditions, and political institutions which they inherit and pass on?’ (2006: 30)  
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of possibility for possibility—is neither a ‘subject’ nor an ‘object’, and therefore it cannot be 
predicted, ‘surveyed’ or ‘demarcated’ (Kompridis 2006: 198). Far more than the already 
slippery concept of ‘culture’, it can’t even really be pinned down. Disclosure, by its very 
nature of existing partly in the time and space of the not-yet, is not a discernable ‘skill’ that 
can be interpreted systematically (Kompridis 2006: 140), and while we may accumulate 
knowledge about critical practices, this will not necessarily translate into progressive 
understanding. And if critique is to be understood as a complex and situated cultural 
practice which contributes to the creation of that which does not yet exist, as well as to the 
exposure of that which is lacking or undesirable in existence; as a force for closing down one 
set of possibilities and opening others, then in order to understand how it works we need 
methodologies that can accommodate such political ontologies.  
 
Kompridis recognises the difficulty of the problem he poses, for when we become 
interested in things such as cracks and disruptions, ontological presuppositions, the ‘unsaid’ 
and ‘unheard’ and ‘unfelt’, and the creation of genuinely new ideas and practices—none of 
which are empirically demonstrable or ‘assimilable to conventional social science’—we must 
also take leave of the familiar boundaries of scientific inquiry, and quite probably of its 
institutional rewards of recognition (Kompridis 2006: 130). In other words, the very 
methodology requires a willingness to be thrown into an unpleasant crisis, for unguaranteed 
intellectual and political returns. Interestingly, it is the very philosophies of knowledge and 
science which ground this tradition of critique that provide us with the necessary tools to do 
this. Critical ethnography, as a way of coming to know the world which Thomas claims 
‘expands our horizons for choice and widens our experiential capacity to see, hear and feel’ 
(Thomas 1993: 2), may be, along with critical philosophy, one of the few methods that can 
enable us to see the invisible, hear the inaudible and imagine the non-existent.  
 
Conceptualising such a project, though, is difficult. Although Kompridis speaks prolifically 
about ‘cultural practices’ and dedicates an entire chapter of Critique and Disclosure to 
‘recovering the everyday’, he gives very little guidance as to what either of these terms refer 
to or how they are grounded experientially. He defines critique as a way to ‘renew’ social 
life (2006: 2, 78), ‘disclose’ the world (2006: 199), ‘facilitate forms of life’ (2006: 199), ‘orient 
action’ (2006: 137), provide ‘intelligibility’ (2006: 74), and solve problems (2006: 111, 113)—
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although in practice, some of these activities will be contradictory. Additionally, critique is 
defined as a reflective practice that is both semantic and normative (2006: 31, 252); 
affective, cognitive and ethical-existential in scope (2006: 15); able to develop ‘new 
normative vocabularies and expectations’ (2006: 137); discerning and evaluative (2006: 14, 
75); a learning process (2006: 8); an activity of decentring of self (2006: 35); and a means of 
keeping the future unclosed (2006: 140, 254). Despite this unclarity, however, the 
overarching argument is relatively straightforward: we need to stop looking for the sources 
of social change only in moments of large-scale collective revolution or deliberate 
movements for political transformation, and start paying more attention to the building 
blocks of possibility which are embedded in the ‘ordinary-extraordinary practices of 
everyday life’ (Kompridis 2006: 78, 116); in the permanent probability of epistemological 
crisis which can be created by the breakdown of ordinary meaning and the denial of hope. 
 
Critical theory and critical ethnography 
 
In my view, this means getting ethnographic—which, depending on one’s position about the 
relationship between ethnography and critical theory, will either be self-evident or 
constitute a fatal category error.3 A friend once told me she thought it was too bad Theodor 
Adorno had not been a better ethnographer; that perhaps had he grounded his critical 
philosophy of freedom more deeply in the gritty affairs of everyday life, the balance 
between cultural despair and political hope in his work might have tipped slightly further in 
the direction of the latter.4 Having some understanding of Adorno’s work, and a great deal 
of respect for his refusal to be optimistic in unwarranted situations, I don’t necessarily 
agree. But I do believe that the future of critical theory will depend on our ability to 
rehabilitate, both methodologically and politically, the passion for researching everyday life 
which underlay the rich materiality of Walter Benjamin’s Arcades (1999), Ernst Bloch’s 
Principle of Hope (1959/1995), Henri Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life (1958/1991), and 
more recently Jeffrey Goldfarb’s Politics of Small Things (2006). The last once even argued 
                                                          
3
 See also Willis and Trondman (2002). 
 
4
 I am grateful to Dr Heidi Seetzen for this thought, shared almost in passing over lunch in the spring of 2008 in 
a Kingston cafe. Neither she nor I knew then that it would linger in the back of my mind and attach itself to the 
various other fleeing ideas which together constitute the framework for this essay.  
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that a truly authentic Marxist theory would take the form of a ‘critical knowledge of 
everyday life’ (Trebitsh 2008: xv), and that ‘everyday life is the supreme court where 
wisdom, knowledge and power are brought to judgment’ (Lefebvre 2008: 6).5 For if it is true, 
as Kompridis has argued, that everyday life is ‘where crisis is most deeply felt, and where 
the responses necessary for its solutions are most endangered’ (2006: 167), and therefore 
that ‘rather than steering the phenomena and practices of world disclosure into a sphere 
remote from everyday life, critical theorists need to conceive of everyday life and practice 
differently’ (Kompridis 2006: 113), critical theorists may have no other choice. 
 
There is already solid ground for building a more ethnographic critical theory, or forms of 
critical ethnography which combine the actual content of critical philosophy (rather than 
simply its principles or intentions) to ethnographic analysis of cultural practice. Kompridis 
has argued that ‘what needs to be added to the defense of democratic forms of life is a 
richer account of the everyday practices that constitute (or are needed to constitute) them’ 
(2006: 76), and that we must identify and foster ‘the bundled set of reflective, critical, and 
innovative capacities through which human beings self-critically transform the social 
practices, cultural traditions, and political institutions which they inherit and pass on’ (2006: 
30). Indeed, it is the lack of this more detailed understanding of how critique works as a 
cultural practice which most disables critical theorists from articulating its importance in a 
convincing way, particularly in the face of detailed ethnographic (and at times even 
ethnomethodological) accounts produced by cultural sociologists which seem to illustrate its 
damaging effects.  
 
One of the reasons we have not been able to adequately respond to the critique of critique 
is that the theorisation of critical practice still happens most often in spaces isolated from 
practice itself. I do not mean that social theory is not a social practice or that critical 
theorists are uniquely detached. Some are, some aren’t. I rather mean that social practice is 
not sufficiently theoretical; that we must be producing critical theories not only about 
cultural practice but through cultural practice; that the critical ethnography of cultural 
                                                          
5
 However, to take up this line of thought would not necessitate returning to its original meaning, where the 
Alltaglichkeit that Lukács wrote about were understood as inauthentic forms of ‘mystification’ (Trebitsh 2008: 
xvii).  
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power and transformation should be recognised as a method for living in the world rather 
than merely as a method for studying it. Rather than seeking out places where we think 
particular kinds of critical practices should emerge, perhaps we should rather be introducing 
them in places where breakdowns of intelligibility seem to be preventing their articulation, 
and where people are floundering to put them in place. I would argue that rather than 
signifying the death of criticality, experiences of confusion, apathy and even despair be the 
very situations in which it may be found. These are the calls for critical ethnography, which 
is ‘grounded empirically in explicit prior evidence of a variety of debilitating social conditions 
that provide the departure point for research’ of cultural forces (Thomas 1993: 33). 
 
Ethnographies of critique in education 
 
Honneth has recommended that we look for such experiences in the ranks—now growing—
of people who are unemployed; of unpaid house-workers (i.e., mothers); and generally of 
anyone denied ‘the opportunity to pursue an economically rewarding and thus socially 
regulated occupation’ (2007: 75). In their massive study published as The Weight of the 
World, Bourdieu’s team (2000) illustrated that they can exist for almost anyone working 
under neoliberal state welfare reforms.  In line with both, I suggest that state-driven 
reforms in knowledge production, education and science have created one of the richest 
fields of evidence for critical debilitation in British society today. The general theory that the 
logic of neoliberal capitalism is imposing new ways of being—indeed, the very ways of being 
which are thought to be the end of critical being in critical theory—is manifested in a 
particularly acute way in many British universities today. It has become commonplace for 
academics and students alike to use the phrase ‘neoliberalisation of education’ to refer to a 
range of cultural and political practices which close down intellectual and political possibility 
through standardising, commercialising and ‘managing’ knowledge, teaching, learning and 
research.6 In this sphere, it seems clear that the experience of contracting possibilities is 
real, that this is happening in extraordinarily small and ordinary increments which register 
only as ephemeral blips on the radar of political repression, and that this particular form of 
change is what gives it so much substantive political power. I say ‘seems’ here because 
                                                          
6
 As Paul Trowler has put it, this is the ‘New Higher Education’ in which managerialist discourses and practices 
that, ‘like all ideologies...it simultaneously simplifies and occludes’ (2001: 187). 
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although the contraction of critical possibility is difficult to deny, it is hard to say that this is 
new. Adorno once remarked, for example, that his own work was made possible because he 
existed outside of formal institutional structures; that he was able to ‘dare to think 
unguarded thoughts, which people are usually “cured” of by the all-powerful control 
mechanism, known as “the university”’ (Adorno and Becker 1999: 23).  
 
In any case, presently, the dominant interpretation of this situation in practice is that it is an 
imposition from without, and the priority has therefore been on registering discontent, 
confusion, despair and disbelief. Indeed, the more the situation is theorised without a clear 
vision of what is actually happening in practice, the more hopelessness seems to set in. This 
is where critical theory and critical ethnographies become important as interventions in 
social process, for as Thomas points out, ‘viewing a given behaviour as a pathology in which 
the actor is acted upon...gives us a dramatically different focus than viewing the behaviour 
as a meaningful action upon the world in which these behaviours might symbolise 
resistance’ (1993: 19). This emphasis on resistance—with no assumptions that it is always 
present or possible—can distinguish critical ethnography from more traditional approaches, 
which define cultural practices as ‘ritualised patterns of social action and discourse 
grounded in the labor of groups and individuals’ (Kurasawa 2007: 150) or as ‘deep discursive 
structures and their institutionalisation (Reed 2007: 12). For the critical theorist–
ethnographer, the main question is not to understand the institutionalisation of social life in 
actuality, but to understand how, under certain circumstances, actuality comes to obtain a 
higher ontological status than possibility, and to understand how the limits of possibility are 
enforced and conserved through cultural practice. 
 
The field of higher education is an obvious field for undertaking Kompridis’ 
recommendations to develop a ‘richer account of the everyday practices that constitute (or 
are needed to constitute) [democratic forms of life]’ (2006: 76) precisely because it 
manifests both the main elements of what critical theorists have defined as the ‘crisis of 
hope’, and a multitude of cultural practices (both ordinary and extraordinary) to resist its 
causes and resolve the crisis in a new direction. For many in the profession, and particularly 
for critical educators, the past decade has been one of explicit discontinuity, confusion and 
frustration as the meaning and purpose of higher education have been rapidly redefined by 
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both market and state, with the encounter of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ making front-page news on 
a regular basis. There are a variety of examples, but an obvious one is a recent trade journal 
report of a statement made by a university vice-chancellor. In a meeting to discuss the 
future of higher education, she argued that to succeed in the new market economy, 
universities should ‘emulate the US coffee chain Starbucks’. While this might optimistically 
be misinterpreted as a contribution to Pierre Bourdieu and Louic Wacquant’s critique of the 
‘McDonaldisation of thought’, of course, it was rather the obverse (1999: 45). In the same 
meeting, a leading member of the government’s funding council for higher education 
asserted that universities would need to embrace ‘speed, changing operating models, 
brand, mission and reputation’; another executive on the same body said that they would 
need to become less ‘hermetic’ and more willing to ‘partner with Government and 
policymakers in a rich way’.7 Indeed, Basil Bernstein once said the same thing, but upside 
down: that knowledge is increasingly being ‘separated from inwardness, from 
commitments, from personal dedication, from the deep structures of the self’—and that 
this could have catastrophic consequences (cited in Beck 1999: 227). Resistance to this 
discourse therefore extends well beyond critical theorists and philosophers, as indicated by 
a public ‘revolt’ of the UK’s most eminent natural scientists against what they describe as 
practices to destroy science itself. As one remarked, in a comment where empirical science 
and critical utopia seen to collide, ‘you cannot command developments at the frontier’.8 
Kompridis himself has noted this in passing, and not only about British society; that ‘the 
legitimacy and validity of the humanities and the arts are undermined...by the insidious 
commercialisation of the university, totally accepted by neoliberal and neoconservative 
regimes, themselves willing agents of market forces’ (2006: 171). 
 
What the abovementioned ‘Starbucks’ article does not make explicit, however, are the 
bedrock of practices and the rich cultural context—tacitly known, but almost nowhere 
articulated—which reveal the comment as one of many innumerable ‘minor’ assaults on 
                                                          
7
 John Gill, ‘The future? Wish upon a Starbucks’, Times Higher Education, 5 March 2009, available online at: 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=26&storycode=405634 (accessed 15 March 
2009). 
 
8
 Zoe Corbyn, ‘Scientists call for a revolt against grant rule they claim will end blue-skies research’, Times 
Higher Education, 12 February 2009, available online at: 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=405350 (accessed 15 March 2009).  
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criticality, autonomy and radical democracy. Indeed, while it is difficult to identify the actual 
practices that create possibilities and the conditions for possibility, it has been possible for 
people to identify the sorts of cultural practices that constrict or deny it in their everyday 
lives. Where plans for international cooperation must be justified through an institutionally 
approved ‘risk assessment’; where proposals for research must be supported by policy-
centred and economically focused ‘impact statements’; where the form and content of 
university courses must be decided months in advance of their offering, and approved on 
grounds of financial efficiency and market popularity by a board of educational managers; 
where lecturers must provide detailed documentation their planning and presentation and 
of students’ participation and evaluation, written in a proscribed language of liberal-
conservative ‘learning and teaching’;9 where students are required to meet ‘learning 
outcomes’ that are predefined not only by teachers but by vast machineries of 
‘benchmarking’; where researchers are required to set and achieve ‘performance targets’ 
for their work, and can be individually disciplined for failing to do so; where critical debate 
about issues of common concern to members of the institution is not only frowned upon as 
disruptive and difficult but repressed through the creation of layers of hierarchical 
bureaucracy which cannot logistically communicate with one another and by the 
progressive erosion of space and time for informal dialogue; where spontaneity in teaching 
or administration is punished as insubordination or incompetence—in such institutional 
conditions, the forces mitigating against critique and utopian practice can seem indomitable 
(Canaan and Amsler 2009; Trowler 2001). If it is true that a critical orientation in the world 
‘places possibility ontologically higher than actuality’ (Heidegger in Kompridis 2006: 15), and 
if the ‘new arouses fear and anxiety because it is not something whose effects we can 
predict and control’, it is clear to see why this orientation is maligned in neoliberal 
institutions. ‘What cannot be tolerated’ in such conditions, argues Allen, ‘are the 
unknowables’ (1998). As a result, critique—and hope, if they are indeed connected—is 
suffocating in the very spaces where it might be expected to flourish most. 
 
                                                          
9
 Matthew Allen (1998) has pointed out that ‘the discourse of teaching and learning is of course not the same 
thing as the actual practices, experiences and so on of being a student or teacher at a university. These 
activities go on within the discourse, even in opposition to it.’  
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Kompridis offers only a few short lines, buried in the midst of other text, to explain the 
relationship between critique and hope. First, he argues that critical theory must be ‘called’. 
In other words, there must first be a reason for critical theory to be needed in the first 
place, which in most cases would be a breakdown or collapse of meaning-making in 
everyday life. Further to this, the breakdown of meaning would have to be experienced by 
someone who is not invested in the dominant sources of meaning and recognition; who 
lives or has the emotional fortitude and social support to live ‘in contradiction to one’s time’ 
or even in contradiction with one’s own self (Kompridis 2006: 5, 267). Her response to the 
‘calling’ would be to create discourses and practices which would ‘facilitate the enlargement 
of meaning and possibility’, which in turn leads to the availability of confidence and hope 
(Kompridis 2006: 136). The ability to do this freely, then, enables the ‘injection of new 
beginnings in public’, and this is what makes freedom and possibility possible (Kompridis 
2006: 136). 
 
This theory of the relationship between critique, hope and social transformation seems to 
include everything, from the cognitive to the affective, the philosophical to the practical. 
What is missing, however, is a sense that the affective and moral foundations of critique—
the personal fortitude required to overcome the messiness, awkwardness, alienation, 
exclusion, and mockery that can come from being in an ‘adversarial relation’ to one’s own 
self, time, colleagues and profession—is itself forged or broken through cultural practice. 
What seems to be understated is attention to the argument that our relationship to the will 
to critique and to responsibility is itself contingent. Classed. Gendered. Raced. Within critical 
philosophy, ‘crisis thinkers’ are represented as types of people, and frankly, these types 
often look very much like white, male, bourgeois, dissident philosophers, for whom it is 
possible to live in contradiction to everything and everyone else and to make one’s own 
suffering into a sustaining virtue. Adorno, for example, has suggested elsewhere that the 
characteristics of intellectual and moral ‘maturity’ are in fact rooted in the ‘ego-bonding, as 
it is developed in the model of the middle-class individual’ (1999: 29). This is changing. But 
the question is, if critical hope depends not just on procedural practices but also on personal 
and emotional ones, how are these made possible in everyday life? I would argue that 
ethnographies of critique—critical, feminist, queer—can help us to understand what it 
means to accept responsibility for being in an ‘almost unbearable’ position of outsider 
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within, from the perspective of the extraordinary ordinary. They can help make visible the 
‘semantic struggle to uncover and transform the meanings unavoidably shaping one’s 
identity and self-understanding’ (Kompridis 2006: 73). And to understand the force of the 
dialectical relationship between pain and ecstasy that this can engender. 
 
Take an example from a recent study of neoliberal discourse within the European academy; 
a woman’s account of a meeting in which people had been informed that raising research 
funding, rather than writing, would be the only legitimate criterion for professional 
recognition, and where a colleague refrained from raising critical questions about the 
change.  
 
‘Her jaw was clenched tight. She would hold firm, she thought. Her shoulders were 
hunched as she dropped into her chair to look at her e-mail. She felt tired thinking 
about the energy that the resistance would take. And she was tired because she 
knew they would get to her through her sense of collegial responsibility – she would 
feel the moral pressure to bring he money in so that they could all survive. 
 
The moment of silence is brief. It depletes her. Yet the thought of how much energy 
resistance would take makes her think it is easier to engage in the new form of 
work—to succumb. She rapidly finds a moral position with which to rationalize her 
compliance—it will be in defence of her colleagues. [...] 
 
[It is the] “mundanely familiar” [which] enables intellectual workers to slide into the 
new ways of speaking and writing about what they do, performing themselves 
appropriately in a global discourse that apparently brooks no dissent. [...] 
 
It is a “ruse of authority that seeks to close itself off from contest” and it the 
interrogation of such authority that lies “at the heart of any radical political project”’ 
(Davies and Petersen 2005: 84). 
 
Here, the experience of epistemological and moral crisis is not necessarily wrought at the 
level of political revolution, but also in the choices we make about what practices to 
legitimise or arrest, in word or deed. When these choices are problematised, critique can 
flourish. When they are naturalised or predetermined, it, and the space for alternative 
futures, is denied.  
 
Kompridis argues that in situations where institutions constrain the emergence of new 
possibilities, two responses are possible: people can either reform the institutions to 
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accommodate new needs, or in a more critical way ‘break existing forms’ in an ongoing 
learning process (2006: 137). The extraordinary everyday lives of educators caught up in 
these reforms, however, suggest that the experience of crisis in this particular context is 
that neither of these are options, within the bounds of what might be considered 
recognisable cultural forms. They suggest that it is entirely possible for institutions to 
constrain possibilities in a third and more fundamental way by aborting natality itself. In 
other words, if the breaking of existing forms is accomplished by ‘calling something into 
being which did not exist before’, we must consider the consequences of forms of power 
which do not simply prevent such beginnings from influencing existing institutional forms or 
becoming new ones (in a Gramscian sense), but which define newness itself as deviant and 
dangerous, and which can make it a legitimate criterion for exclusion from everyday life 
itself. Totalitarian forms of power. This has implications for Kompridis’ theory that anyone 
working against the grain of everyday foreclosure must understand the possibility that ‘the 
validity of her critique can be established only under the altered historical and cultural 
conditions it normatively prefigures’ (2006: 5), for this ultimately requires the existence of 
spaces in which even such invalid critiques can be spoken and heard. It requires, as Arendt 
once argued, the possibility to ‘inject new beginnings in public’ (cited in Kompridis 2006: 
254). 
 
It is thus the dislocated, fragmented and not-yet-articulated struggles against this kind of 
power, this repression of practices of disclosure, which I think are most urgent spaces of 
critical intervention. They are also the most promising locations for developing finely 
textured, critical understandings of the complex of economic and political processes and 
cultural practices that critical theorists call in more general terms the contemporary ‘crisis of 
hope’. The framing of the questions in practice mirrors the framing of the problems in 
theory: ‘are academics faced with a set of discursive practices that are antithetical to the 
kind of critique and open questioning that lie at the heart of intellectual work?’ (Davies and 
Petersen 2005: 78). And if so, what might their practices of critique be able to teach us 
about critical practice in everyday life? It is even more significant that those involved in 
these struggles, particularly those who accept the maxim that ‘teaching is a creative act, a 
critical act, and not a mechanical one’ (Freire 2002: 81), deliberately articulate critique as a 
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radical practice of hope, and are attempting to develop ‘new vocabularies of reasoning’ that 
make this an organising principle of practice.  
 
Their work thus combines critical resistance to the closing down of meaning, space and time 
with the institutionalisation of collective dialogue and reflection. In their own work, there is 
a first of all a consistent effort to resist the new vocabularies that aim to fix meaning, not 
only in a particular way, but totally. There is an awareness here that ‘possibility is a function 
of vocabulary’, as well as a consciousness that it must be very much more than this 
(Kompridis 2006: 137). As noted above, these spaces of criticality are not simply ‘there’ 
because the university is a polyvocal place of competing discourses; rather, they are 
created, often at the expense of disproportionate emotional and intellectual energies. 
Foucault’s maxim that wherever there is power, there is resistance does not necessarily 
translate into practices of resistance. This discursive work is therefore coupled with efforts 
to carve out autonomous spaces which allow and value spontaneity in educational 
practice—sometimes in the classroom, but increasingly outside through informal 
associations and groups (Ainley and Canaan 2005). These spaces are deliberately organised 
in ways that prioritise dialogue over efficiency and cooperation over individual 
responsibility. They are also temporally reflexive, in so far as individuals must work reorder 
and reinterpret their everyday priorities to justify devoting additional time to reflection, 
dialogue and disclosure. And finally, there is an increasing attempt to produce collective 
accounts of individual experiences and personal practices, ‘adopt critical theoretical 
positions which locate discourse in relation to power and resources and identify social 
inequalities in terms of their effects to do whatever we can to render challengeable any one 
way of seeing the world’ (Trowler 2001: 197). There is already a movement, in other words, 
towards collective ethnography. 
 
Here, however, is where critical theory is most necessary, for this is not yet an ethnography 
of critique where critique is understood as a means for epistemological and social 
transformation. The academics I speak of presently engage primarily in what Thomas calls 
‘existential rebellion’, or the creation of meaning through resistance (1993: 48). Thomas 
argues that the concept describes ‘forms of social existence in which the potential to act is 
obstructed and social actors remain powerless relative to their potential to engage and 
17 
 
transcend their circumstances’ (1993: 50). It is only through ‘acts of resistance’ that they 
become avoid being defined by them—a term which is also used by the late Pierre Bourdieu 
to describe the everyday practices of refusal in language which deny the neoliberal 
worldview total hegemony. However, while it is comforting to believe that these practices 
are spaces of hope simply because they temporarily arrest processes of contraction, we 
cannot ignore that these acts are made within the political and economic conditions of their 
possibility. People who struggle to ‘go on’ when the intelligibility of their already-known 
alternatives breaks down or is denied possibility are pre-utopian. They are ‘between past 
and future’, not between present and future. Indeed, if the bulk of critical energy within 
everyday practice is directed towards resisting the closed-ness and contraction of 
possibilities within that space, then the proliferation of possibilities outside of it can be both 
chaotic and disorienting. Additionally, though it perhaps need not be spelled out, 
‘inequities, tensions, and oppressions that permeate mainstream society appear in 
“alternative” spaces as well’ (Cote et al. 2007: 204). And, as Kompridis points out, practices 
to expand the cultural conditions of meaning can only be meaningful when engaged 
cooperatively and collectively, rather than as ‘heroic creations of new disclosure and new 
beginnings’, and can only be relevant for practice when they are ‘intimate’ rather than 
‘detached’ (2006: 170, 191, 274). Hence, the critical practices necessary to create the 
cultural conditions for the liberation of possibility are themselves deeply affected by social 
and material contingencies. 
 
The ethnography of critique as a cultural practice thus begins where traditional 
ethnographies of cultural resistance end. The study of the practice of possibility, of hope, 
begins above all at the point at which possibilities have become impossible, and where 
individuals and collectivities nevertheless attempt to go on ‘cooperatively displacing the 
world anew’ (Kompridis 2006: 280). To quote Adorno (1999: 32), we must consider the 
possibility that  
 
‘any serious attempts to intervene  in order to alter our world in any specific area 
immediately come up against the overwhelming force of inertia in the prevailing 
situation, and seem condemned to impotence. Anyone who wishes to bring about 
change can probably do so at all, by turning that very impotence, and their own 
impotence, into an active ingredient in their thinking and maybe in their actions too’.  
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We must therefore theorise critique and hope as cultural practices, rather than simply as 
the foundation for cultural practices, understanding the ‘cultural labour’ that makes them 
possible (e.g., Kurasawa 2007). For Lefebvre, the critique of everyday life was the path to 
revolution—a path back not to the ‘empirical’ but to the concrete; not forward to science, 
but into life (Trebitsh 2008: xx). 
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